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The Regulation of Television Sports Broadcasting: A Comparative Analysis 
 
Paul Smith, Tom Evens & Petros Iosifidis 
 
Introduction  
The development of top-level professional sport into a highly valuable global industry has 
been well documented (e.g. Boyle and Haynes, 2000; Horne, 2006). Equally, it has also long 
been appreciated that sport is a sociocultural activity valued by millions of people across the 
globe (Coalter, 2007; Maguire, 1999). In both of these realms – the economic and the 
sociocultural – the media, and particularly television, has played a vital role in shaping the 
nature of contemporary sport. On the one hand, sports organisations and television 
broadcasters have built a synergetic relationship that has allowed both to further their 
commercial interests. In this sense, the commodification of sport has served the interests of 
all the main participants within the ‘sports-media-business complex’, including media 
conglomerates, marketing agencies, brands and sponsors, sports event organisers, sports 
associations and even professional athletes, if not always sports fans (Andrews, 2003; Law et 
al, 2002; Nicholson, 2007). Just as significantly, on the other hand, in many countries free-to-
air television coverage of sports events and competitions, by either public service 
broadcasters and/or national commercial networks, has facilitated shared viewing 
experiences, which have fostered a sense of national identity and cultural citizenship (Rowe, 
2004; Scherer and Whitson, 2009). More generally, free-to air broadcasting of sporting 
events has played a key role in the establishment of sport as a significant part of popular 
culture. Paradoxically, free-to-air sports broadcasting provided the foundations on which the 
highly commercialised sports industry of today is built.   
 
This article focuses on how the contrasting perspectives on television and sport cited above 
have been reflected in different approaches to the regulation of sports broadcasting. First, 
competition policy aims to facilitate free, fair and effective competition within the sports 
broadcasting market (Iosifidis, 2011). And, second, sector specific media regulation, in this 
case, major events legislation (also commonly referred to as listed events or anti-siphoning 
legislation), aims to guarantee the public’s right to information and preserve free access to 
television coverage of major national or international sporting events, such as the Olympic 
Games, or the FIFA World Cup (Lefever, 2012). However, there have been repeated calls 
from pay-TV broadcasters and some sports organisations to limit the application of both of 
these strands of regulation, particularly the latter (Scherer and Sam, 2012). Here, we make the 
case for a regulatory approach that seeks to balance the commercial priorities of broadcasters 
and sports organisations with the wider sociocultural benefits citizens gain from free-to-air 
sports broadcasting. Based on the comparative analysis of a range of different national sports 
broadcasting markets, this article suggests that in many cases the balance between commerce 
and culture in sports broadcasting has shifted too far in favour of the commercial interests of 
dominant pay-TV broadcasters and sports organisations seeking to maximise their income 
from the sale of broadcast rights. As a result, citizens often face either the loss of access to 
television coverage of key sporting events and competitions and/or rising bills from pay-TV 
services. Against this background, we contend that policy makers and regulators should: first, 
resist pressure from pay-TV broadcasters and/or sporting organisations to abolish/undermine 
major events legislation, or consider the introduction of such legislation if it is not already in 
place; and, second, tackle the market power of sports channel owners and/or broadcast 
delivery platforms through the application of competition law, albeit with consideration for 
the cultural specificities of  sports broadcasting.   
 
Ultimately, decisions on the regulation of sports broadcasting are political ones about the 
balance between the free market and government intervention in the economy and the type of 
society we want to live in. With this in mind, the article begins by providing a brief overview 
of the politics of sports broadcasting regulation, with particular reference to major events 
legislation and competition law. The main part of the article then provides an analysis of the 
regulation of sports broadcasting across a range of different countries, namely Australia, 
Brazil, India, Italy, South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), as 
well as the European Union (EU).
1
 Admittedly, at least in part, these examples have been 
selected because they reflect the interests of the authors, but they also offer a relatively global 
outlook and serve to illustrate three general regulatory approaches: i) free market; ii) strong 
regulation; and, iii) balanced regulation. Most significantly, this comparative analysis 
provides evidence to suggest that a balanced (or at least close to balanced) approach to sports 
broadcasting regulation, which best serves the combined interests of broadcasters, sports 
organisations and citizens, can be achieved in practice.    
 
The Politics of Sports Broadcasting Regulation 
The introduction of major events legislation in some of the countries discussed below (as well 
as the EU) has been justified on the grounds that, in the absence of such legislation, coverage 
of high profile sporting events will tend to migrate from free-to-air broadcasting to pay-TV. 
There is certainly considerable evidence to support this point of view. Perhaps most notably, 
in Europe, since the 1990s, live television coverage of top level domestic football has largely 
shifted from free-to-air to pay-TV. In the US, the migration of sports coverage to pay-TV has 
been less apparent (Szymanski, 2006), but, in recent years, even in the US, there has been a 
discernible shift in the availability of premium sports programming from free-to-air 
broadcasters to (cable and/or satellite) pay-TV broadcasters (Zimbalist, 2006). For example, 
in 2006, the US pay-TV broadcaster, ESPN, prompted considerable controversy when it 
acquired the rights to broadcast the traditional Monday Night Football game, which had been 
available to free-to-air viewers via US network television for over thirty years. At the same 
time, however, it should be emphasised that much, if not most, of the sports coverage 
provided by pay-TV broadcasters does not consist of programming previously available via 
free-to-air broadcasters. Pay-TV broadcasters have hugely increased the total amount of 
sports programming available on television. For example, in the UK, Boyle and Haynes 
(2000: ix) note how 2,800 hours of television sport was produced by four free-to-air 
broadcasters in 1989, whereas, by 2012, BSkyB alone was providing around 35,000 hours of 
sports programming per year across four separate sports channels (excluding Sky Sports 
News) for its UK subscribers (Oxford Economics, 2012: 19). For the most part, the additional 
sports programming provided by pay-TV broadcasters over the last couple of decades has 
consisted of either more extensive coverage of sports that were previously shown by free-to-
air broadcasters, or coverage of sports and sporting events that previously received little, if 
any, airtime on free-to-air television. BskyB, for instance, was recently estimated to dedicate 
nearly half of its annual total of 35,000 hours of sport to ‘non-core’ sports, including, 
yachting, angling, darts, netball, speedway and badminton (ibid.).  
 
The growth of pay-TV has provided significant benefits for both viewers and sports 
organisations, but this does not lessen the case for major events legislation. The argument for 
major events legislation is based on its potential to promote (and/or preserve) cultural 
citizenship in two key ways. First, major events legislation may be justified on grounds of 
equity. For example, the Australian government’s recent review of its anti-siphoning scheme 
stressed that it had received ‘many submissions from the general public’ that expressed 
concern about the ‘costs of pay television’ (DBCDE, 2010: 11). In countries like Brazil, India 
and South Africa, which exhibit even wider disparities between social classes, the exclusion 
of low income groups from access to sporting events broadcast exclusively on pay-TV is 
likely to be even more significant. Secondly, one of the main benefits of ensuring that major 
sporting events are broadcast on free-to-air television is the generation of what economists 
refer to as ‘positive network externalities’. In simple terms, an individual not only enjoys the 
event and the ‘conversational network’ though viewing, their participation also adds value to 
the network for everyone (Boardman and Hargreaves-Heap, 1999). This concept is highly 
significant to the debate on major events legislation because it can be seen to apply to the 
difficult to quantify, but no less real, shared benefits that can result from the coverage of 
major sporting events on universally available free-to-air broadcasting.  
 
For the most part, opposition to major events legislation stems from an underlying 
commitment to free market principles. The opposition of many sports organisations to the 
listing of their sports is based on the belief that they are best placed to judge how to further 
the interests of their own sport, and in particular how to balance the potentially increased 
revenue to be gained via pay-TV with the benefits (not least commercial via increased 
sponsorship revenue) of greater exposure through free-to-air broadcasting. However, the key 
argument in support of major events legislation is not that policy makers and regulators know 
better than individual sports organisations how to promote the best interests of a particular 
sport. Rather, it is, as discussed above, that the wider public interest in the form of cultural 
citizenship is served by the availability of particular sporting events on free-to-air television. 
For sports organisations whose events are protected for free-to-air coverage, the existence of 
major events legislation may be a source of frustration, but it is not particularly unusual in 
democratic societies for certain property rights to be subject to state regulation in the public 
interest. For example, planning laws mean that those who live in heritage properties cannot 
do with them exactly what they want. To promote cultural citizenship, the same is true for 
sports organisations and listed events. An extra sentence needed to make this comparison 
clearer.  
 
The other main advocates of a free market in sports broadcasting have been pay-TV 
broadcasters, who frequently claim that too many events are covered by major events 
legislation. According to pay-TV broadcasters (and others??), this is, at least in part, a 
product of the lack of clear criteria against which to judge whether an event should be listed 
(Solberg, 2002). The EU is able to counter such criticism by reference to its four ‘reliable 
indicators of the importance of events for society’, but the same line of defence is not 
available beyond Europe (see below).  
 
To date, the application of competition law to sports broadcasting has focused mainly on the 
collective selling by sports leagues of the rights to broadcast exclusive live coverage of their 
sports. The case for regulatory intervention is based on the argument that by selling their 
rights collectively through a league teams act as a cartel. From this perspective, collective 
selling agreements have a tendency to restrict competition in three main ways. First, 
collective selling gives the league market power to dictate the price of broadcast rights, which 
leads to inflated prices for both broadcasters (upstream) and consumers (downstream). 
Second, collective selling arrangements also tend to limit the availability of rights to sports 
events. This is because teams often fear that live broadcast coverage of matches will 
undermine their attendance revenue. By selling their broadcast rights collectively, teams have 
a mechanism through which they can limit the total number (and time) of games broadcast so 
as to lessen the impact on attendance revenue. Third, collective selling arrangements can 
strengthen the market position of the most important broadcasters because they are the only 
operators who are able to bid for all the rights in a package. In theory, if broadcast rights were 
sold by individual clubs, rather than collectively, there would be more possibilities for other 
broadcasters to obtain rights, which, in turn, would foster competition in broadcasting.        
 
In defence of the collective selling of broadcast rights, it is pointed out that sport, and in 
particular team sport, has a number of distinct economic characteristics which make the 
application of general competition law inappropriate. First, the production of sporting 
contests in professional team sports requires joint production by at least two individual teams. 
Consequently, unlike the underhand and/or secret behaviour that typifies cartels in other areas 
of business, team sports, by definition, need to co-operate and do so openly through leagues 
and tournaments. Second, a league or competition is more exiting and attractive to fans (and 
broadcasters) if the outcome is uncertain. Consequently, no team has a long term interest in 
the failure of its main sporting competitor(s). Supporters of collective selling claim that, if 
individual teams are allowed to sell the broadcast rights to their matches, it leads to 
significant income disparities between teams, which reduces the competitive balance of the 
league and, in turn, undermines the long term popularity of the competition. There is 
considerable evidence to support this argument from leagues where individual selling has 
been allowed (see the case of Italy below). By contrast, leagues that operate collective selling 
share the revenue from broadcast rights much more evenly, albeit in various ways and to 
varying degrees. On this basis, it can be argued that the collective selling of broadcast rights 
may be pro-competitive, rather than anti-competitive, and as such should be granted 
exemption from competition law. 
 
The competition issues raised by broadcasters seeking to use sports programming to ensure a 
competitive advantage over their rivals are just as, if not more significant, than those related 
to collective selling by sports leagues. Thoughout the world, the ownership of exclusive live 
premium sports rights has become a key source of market power within contemporary 
broadcasting. One way to address this issue might be to simply impose a ban on exclusive 
deals for live sports rights (Harbord and Szymanski, 2004). However, such a move could well 
fatally undermine the sports programming market. Broadcasters are unlikely to be willing to 
invest significant sums to provide coverage of sporting events also available elsewhere. The 
alternative approach adopted by competition law, particularly within Europe, at both national 
and EU level, has been to treat the broadcast rights for exclusive live sports programming, 
particularly football, in accordance with the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ (Levey, 1999). The 
‘essential facilities doctrine’ effectively denotes that certain upstream (i.e. sports rights) 
inputs are essential/indispensable for downstream broadcasters to compete in the relevant 
market (i.e. sports programming) and cannot easily be replicated without significantly raising 
costs. Following on from this, to facilitate competition, access is provided to the ‘essential 
facility’ for all market players on ‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory’ terms, which are 
overseen by broadcasting and/or competition regulators.  
The ‘essential facilities’ approach is most salient in relation to disputes between sports 
channel owners and controllers/owners of delivery platforms. For sports channels owned by 
sports teams (as well other independent owners) access to the most popular delivery 
platforms (e.g. cable network, DTH satellite etc.) is a prerequisite for commercial success. 
Equally, in pay-TV markets where the main broadcast sports rights are also owned by the 
owner of a delivery platform, the owners of rival distribution platforms will require access to 
sports programming/channels in order to be competitive. Broadly speaking, competition 
issues related to the distribution of sports programming have predominately arisen in US 
broadcasting as a result of the former scenario (Zimbalist, 2006), whereas in pay-TV markets 
in Europe and beyond the latter issue has often prompted more concern from competition 
authorities and broadcasting regulators (Smith, 2013). Regulators should be prepared (and 
have political support) to intervene so as to guarantee reasonable terms of access for both 
sports channels and delivery platforms, but this is not always the case.  
 
Comparing the Regulation of Sports Broadcasting  
Of course, the regulation of sports broadcasting in each of the countries considered here 
reflects the particular historical, political and cultural traditions of the country concerned. For 
the purpose of comparative analysis, however, the type and degree of regulatory intervention 
can usefully be seen as a continuum with the ‘free market’ at one end and ‘strong regulation’ 
at the other. In the ‘free market’ case, sports broadcasting is completely left to the market 
with no (or minimal) role for public service broadcasting and only a ‘light touch’ regulatory 
framework, which does little to tackle the market power of dominant commercial interests or 
to ensure free-to-air television coverage of major sports events. In the ‘strong regulation’ 
case, public service (or commercial free-to-air) broadcaster(s) are granted a dominant role in 
sports broadcasting, supported by a regulatory approach that guarantees free-to-air television 
coverage for an extensive list of major (and not so major) sporting events. In addition, 
competition policy principles are applied with little regard for the distinctive economic and 
sociocultural features of sporting competitions and sports broadcasting. 
 
 
Figure 1: Free market versus strong regulation 
 
In reality, most countries fall somewhere between these two extremes and some (e.g. India) 
combine an interventionist approach to major events legislation with a less interventionist 
approach to the application of competition law (or vice versa). Figure 1 provides a general 
indication of the different regulatory positions adopted in relation to sports broadcasting in 
each of the countries analysed. On this basis, we suggest that three different regulatory 
approaches are clearly discernible within global sports broadcasting: a free market model; a 
strong regulation model; and, a balanced model. The first two approaches tend to produce 
significant imbalances between the cultural and commercial interests associated with sports 
broadcasting, whereas the latter approach is defined by clear attempts to balance these 
potentially conflicting interests. 
 
The Free Market Approach 
Broadly speaking, sports broadcasting in Brazil, the US and South Africa can be 
characterised as predominantly market-driven. In each of these countries, there is no (or only, 
in the case of South Africa, fairly weak) major events legislation. The application of 
competition law has been virtually non-existent in Brazil and South Africa, but has been 
more significant in the US. Perhaps most notably, the free market approach has been a 
defining feature of US broadcasting since its very inception. In terms of the development of 
US sports broadcasting, three key points are worth noting, the first two of which have led to 
its ‘free market’ categorisation. First, the public service broadcaster, PBS, was quickly 
overpowered by commercial networks in the bidding process for popular sports rights 
(Walker and Ferguson, 1998). Second, during the 1970s, rules introduced by the US 
broadcasting regulator, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), designed to prevent 
cable broadcasters from acquiring the rights to broadcast ‘specific events’ (e.g. the baseball 
World Series final, the Super Bowl of American football and the Olympic Games) were 
successfully challenged in court on the grounds that they infringed the First Amendment’s 
right to freedom of speech (Wolohan, 2009). However, despite these two developments, 
(commercial) free-to-air broadcasters continue to play a leading role in US sports 
broadcasting. Third, the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act was explicitly designed by Congress 
to ensure that US competition law would take into consideration the special features of sports 
broadcasting and thus permit the collective (i.e. cartel) selling of broadcast rights by the 
major US sporting leagues. Rather than general competition law, the prevention of anti-
competitive behaviour in US sports broadcasting has largely been left to the FCC, which has 
tended to focus on disputes over the distribution of sports channels between channel owners 
and pay-TV delivery platforms on a case by case basis, especially with regard to regional 
sports networks (Moss, 2008). For example, in 2007, a high profile exclusive distribution 
deal between the MLB Network (baseball) and the satellite provider, DirecTV, prevented 
access to the channel(s) by cable broadcasters. After the FCC threatened regulatory 
intervention, the MLB lessened its exclusive reliance on DirecTV and allowed access to 
alternative distributors (Associated Press, 2007). However, the general trend toward the 
migration of live coverage of major sports to league-owned premium channels could well 
result in the need for a more comprehensive policy intervention in the US to ensure a 
competitive sports broadcasting market. 
 
As in the US, Brazil’s approach to broadcasting policy has been largely driven by 
commercial, rather than sociocultural objectives (Sinclair, 1999). However, unlike the US, 
Brazil has a relatively weak tradition of competition law. The last decade or so has witnessed 
the establishment of a new competition law framework in Brazil, but, to date, this has had 
little impact on the established media companies and, most significantly, has not prevented 
the leading commercial broadcaster, TV Globo, from retaining its dominant position in 
Brazilian broadcasting, as well as Brazilian media more generally (Fox and Waisbord, 2002). 
However, Brazil’s main competition authority, the Administrative Council for Economic 
Defence (CADE), has acted to end TV Globo’s exclusive control of some top domestic and 
international soccer rights, forcing Globo to sublicense its popular SporTV channels to rival 
pay-TV operators (OECD, 2010). Just as, if not more significantly, there is also no major 
events legislation in Brazil. To date, this has not resulted in a migration of live sports 
coverage to pay-TV channels, largely because of the high costs associated with subscription 
services. However, fuelled by the country’s recent rapid economic growth, a prosperous 
middle class is emerging in Brazil and pay-TV has experienced extraordinary growth during 
the last few years, which, according to television analysts, is set to continue. In 2013, Brazil 
had around 17 million pay-TV households, by 2017, this figure is predicted to rise to around 
40 million (Forester, 2013). As a result, a form of major events legislation may soon be 
required in Brazil to guarantee large numbers of Brazilian citizens, especially the less well-
off and those in rural areas, access to live free-to-air television coverage of major sporting 
events.  
 
Over the last couple of decades, South Africa has also adopted a market driven approach to 
(sports) broadcasting (Duncan and Glen, 2010). The defining feature of the South African 
sports broadcasting market is the dominant position of the pay-TV broadcaster, MultiChoice, 
and in particular its digital service, DStv, which includes the SuperSport channel(s). 
MultiChoice has built its commercial success on the extensive (and often exclusive) 
television coverage of South Africa’s most popular sports: rugby, football and cricket. In 
response, during the early 2000s, the government introduced major events legislation, which 
has enabled the country’s main public service broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), to claw back coverage of some major sporting events. Furthermore, 
live coverage of matches during the 2010 FIFA World Cup Finals (hosted by South Africa) 
was provided by the commercial free-to-air broadcaster, e.tv. However, the protection offered 
to free-to-air viewers by South Africa’s major events legislation has some significant 
limitations. First, a pay-TV broadcaster is not prevented from acquiring the rights to a 
national sporting event, but is merely required to sublicense the rights to such an event to a 
free-to-air broadcaster. And second, South Africa’s sports broadcasting regulations do not 
require the live coverage of national sporting events, only that such events ‘be broadcast live, 
delayed live or delayed by a free-to-air broadcasting service’ (ICASA, 2010a). In practice 
therefore South Africa’s major events legislation has meant that the television rights to most 
events are first acquired by MultiChoice. To fulfil its public service mandate and offer some 
coverage of the event, the (cash strapped) SABC is then forced to negotiate with the 
subscription broadcaster for secondary rights. Just as importantly, to date at least, competition 
law has had even less impact on the South African sports broadcasting market. MultiChoice’s 
rivals have all urged South Africa’s communications regulator, the ICASA, to intervene and 
tackle competition concerns related the distribution of sports channels (ICASA, 2010b). For 
South Africa to benefit from a more competitive broadcasting market, the ICASA will need 
to respond. 
 
The Strong Regulation Approach  
Australia and (to a lesser extent) India can be seen as examples of the strong regulation of 
sports broadcasting. This is mainly due to the form of major events legislation adopted in 
each country. The Australian system has two key features, which distinguish it from the EU’s 
approach (see below). First, it is based on a ‘first choice’ approach, which gives free-to-air 
broadcasters priority in the acquisition of broadcast rights and prevents pay-TV broadcasters 
from obtaining the exclusive rights to listed events. Second, the range and the number of 
sporting events covered by the Australian list are much more extensive than those adopted in 
Europe. For instance, the Australian list (2006-2010) was estimated to cover over 1800 
events in a given year (excluding four-yearly tournaments such as the Olympics), whereas 
most European countries cover fewer than 100 events (excluding four-yearly tournaments) 
(DBCDE, 2010). Taken together, these features have led to competition for sports rights in 
Australia to be skewed significantly in favour of (commercial) free-to-air broadcasters. At 
least partly as a result, the Australian scheme has also not always promoted the cultural 
citizenship of Australian viewers in the way originally intended. In some cases, free-to-air 
broadcasters have profited by reselling sports rights to pay-TV operators. On other occasions, 
free-to-air broadcasters have been accused of ‘hoarding’ rights with no intention to broadcast 
merely so as to prevent pay-TV operators from obtaining valuable rights (Perrine, 2001). 
Legislative changes have subsequently been introduced to tackle such abuses, but it could 
still be argued that the long list of events protected for broadcast on free-to-air television has 
produced a relatively underdeveloped (in terms of economic value) sports broadcasting 
market in Australia. However, this may be set to change. Towards the end of 2013, the newly 
elected conservative Liberal-National coalition government announced its plan for 
‘deregulation in the communications portfolio’ (DoC, 2013). In response, the Australian 
Subscription Television and Radio Association (ASTRA) has already put forward a plan to 
permit sports organisations to sell the rights for listed events ‘in parallel’ to both free-to-air 
broadcasters and pay-TV (Heffernan, 2014). Any move in this direction would certainly 
highlight the need for a more interventionist approach to the application of competition law to 
sports broadcasting in Australia. To date, competition law has not prevented the 
establishment of a highly concentrated Australian pay-TV sector, dominated by Foxtel 
(jointly owned by News Corporation and Telstra) and its only sports channels, Fox Sports. In 
fact, the most significant competition case to focus on sports broadcasting, the so-called C7 
case, served only to confirm Foxtel’s dominance of the Australian pay-TV market (Healey, 
2009). 
 
India’s major events legislation can also be seen to provide strong regulatory protection for 
the coverage of major sporting events on free-to-air television, via the Indian public service 
television broadcaster, Doordarshan. The (2007) Sports Broadcasting Signal (mandatory 
sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act prevents any pay-TV broadcaster from carrying live 
coverage of ‘sporting events of national importance’, unless it simultaneously shares its 
signal with Doordarshan. However, the law offers little guidance on the criteria used to select 
‘sporting events of national importance’. This is perhaps most problematic in relation to 
broadcast coverage of India’s national cricket team. Cricket is by far India’s most popular 
sport and yet key decisions over which international cricket Test matches are to be 
safeguarded for free-to-air broadcast coverage are left to the discretion of the Indian 
government. Consequently, to the consternation and confusion of many observers, some Test 
matches involving the Indian cricket team are made available via Doordarshan, but others are 
not, perhaps most notably the final Test match of India’s cricketing hero, Sachin Tendulkar 
(India v. West Indies, November 2013). Just as problematically, India’s major events 
legislation also specifies that the sharing of television rights for listed events should take 
place on the basis of a revenue sharing agreement between the parties, with advertising 
revenue shared between the content rights owner/holder and Doordarshan in the ratio of not 
less than 75:25. However, this system has often resulted in Doordarshan effectively losing 
money when broadcasting listed events, as it could have earned more advertising revenue 
with its regular programming than the 25 per cent share of advertising revenue it gains from 
broadcasting a listed event.  
 
Unlike major events legislation, competition law has had little impact on sports broadcasting 
in India. However, given the importance of cricket to Indian pay-TV (akin to football in 
Europe), it is perhaps unsurprising that the attention of the recently (2009) established 
Competition Commission of India (CCI) has been drawn to the selling of television cricket 
rights. Since the 1990s, the awarding of cricket rights has repeatedly been mired in 
controversy, often related to the conduct of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), 
the national governing body of all cricket in India. In 2013, the CCI ruled that the BCCI had 
abused its dominant position in the award of commercial contracts to the highly lucrative 
Indian Premier League (IPL) and fined the governing body six per cent of average annual 
revenue over the last three years, around Rs 52.24 crore (CCI, 2013). In all likelihood, further 
regulatory intervention will be required to ensure a more open, transparent and competitive 
market for the selling of cricket rights. Currently, the most valuable sports rights are divided 
between a number of major broadcasters – News Corporation (Star Sports), Sony (SonySix) 
and Zee TV (Ten Sports). However, with the growth of satellite and digital cable television, 
the commercial incentives to expand and dominate the Indian market are likely to intensify. 
In these circumstances, the CCI will have a crucial role to play to ensure that Indian viewers 
are able to benefit from a competitive sports broadcasting market.   
 
 
 
The Balanced Regulation Approach  
The EU’s regulation of sports broadcasting provides the best example of a balanced 
approach. Initially adopted during the late 1990s as part of the renewed Television Without 
Frontiers Directive and then subsequently incorporated into the 2007 (and then 2010) 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (EC, 2010, Article 14), EU major events legislation is 
based on a ‘dual rights’ system. This approach (unlike in Australia) allows the television 
rights to listed events to be purchased by either free-to-air or pay-TV broadcasters, but not 
broadcast exclusively on pay-TV, unless there is no interest in providing coverage of an event 
from a free-to-air broadcaster. However, the implementation of the EU’s major events 
legislation has not been without its problems. First, in accordance with the terms of the 
Directive, whilst a number of Member States, including some of the largest, have taken up 
the opportunity to submit lists of major events to the Commission, most (20 out of 28) have 
opted not to do so. Second, the EU’s major events legislation contains a number of ‘vague 
definitions’ (Evens and Lefever, 2011). For example, the Directive states that a major event 
should not be broadcast in such a way that a ‘substantial proportion’ of the public are 
deprived of the possibility of following the event on free television. However, it does not 
provide a precise definition of ‘substantial proportion’. As a result, Member States have been 
left to offer their own slightly different definitions of the term, ranging from 70 to 95 per cent 
of the population. And, third, the Directive itself also provides little guidance on what might 
reasonably be regarded as an ‘event of major importance for society’. However, the 
Commission has moved to remedy this point. To be formally agreed by the Commission, 
events included in a proposed list from a Member State are required to meet at least two of 
the following criteria deemed to be ‘reliable indicators of the importance of events for 
society’:  
 
i) a special general resonance within the Member State, and not simply a significance 
to those who ordinarily follow the sport or activity concerned;  
ii) a generally recognised, distinct cultural importance for the population in the Member 
State, in particular as a catalyst of cultural identity; 
iii) involvement of the national team in the event concerned in the context of a 
competition or tournament of international importance; and 
iv) the fact that the event has traditionally been broadcast on free-to-air television and 
has commanded large audiences. (EC, 2007a). 
 
Crucially, the relatively clear set of criteria adopted by the Commission for the selection of 
listed events has provided EU major events legislation with a degree of protection from legal 
challenge. Most notably, in 2007, FIFA and UEFA challenged the lists of major events 
adopted by Belgium and the UK on the grounds that, unlike in other Member States, both 
countries had listed entire FIFA (World Cup) and UEFA (European Championship) 
tournaments, rather than just the matches involving their respective countries and/or semi-
final and final matches. In reaching its judgement, the European Court made explicit 
reference to the listing criteria employed by the Commission and declared that it was 
legitimate for some Members States to include the whole tournament in their national list, 
even if this was not the case in other Member States (European Court, 2011). Given this 
example, the adoption of clear criteria for the selection of events to be protected for free-to-
air coverage in other countries, such as Australia and India, may be seen as a means to 
provide increased legitimacy for major events legislation, rather than a means to facilitate the 
removal of events from a list as often sought by pay-TV broadcasters and/or some sports 
organisations. 
 
The EU’s application of competition law to sports broadcasting has followed a similarly 
balanced approach. Instead of condemning the collective selling of football rights outright, 
the Commission has sought to amend the practice so as to dilute its anti-competitive 
tendencies. For example, during the early 2000s, the Commission negotiated a number of 
important changes to the way that UEFA sold the rights to its Champions League football 
competition, including the introduction of a three-year limit to the length of any exclusive 
deal, the division of television rights into a number of separate (gold and silver) packages and 
the unbundling of new media rights. According to the Commission, UEFA’s modified 
arrangements were sufficient to allow UEFA to continue to sell its rights collectively ‘to the 
benefit of all stakeholders in the game’ (EC, 2003). The UEFA case proved particularly 
significant because it provided a template for the Commission’s approach to other instances 
of the collective selling of football rights by national leagues, most notably the Bundesliga in 
Germany and the Premier League (PL) in England. In the Bundesliga case, again, the 
duration of any exclusive deal was limited to three years and the rights were unbundled into 
nine different packages, including separate packages for television and new media rights (EC, 
2005a). The PL case proved more challenging, but, following lengthy negotiations between 
the Commission and the PL, it was agreed the rights for live PL matches (seasons 2006-7 to 
2009-10) would be sold in ‘six balanced packages with no one bidder being able to buy all 
six packages’ (EC, 2005b). This move effectively ended BSkyB’s monopoly of the live rights 
to PL football. More generally, the EU’s approach to the application of competition law 
means that collective selling remains the dominant model for the selling of broadcast rights to 
top level football in Europe. Indeed, the European Commission has praised collective selling 
as ‘a tool for achieving greater solidarity within sports’ (EC, 2007b). 
 
The UK has also adopted a relatively balanced approach to the regulation of sports 
broadcasting. In reaction to BSkyB’s sports rights buying strategy, reforms to strengthen UK 
major events legislation were introduced as part of the 1996 Broadcasting Act (Smith, 2010). 
Subsequently, the events included on the list and the level of protection offered for free-to-air 
broadcasters has been the subject of much public and political debate. Most notably, in 1998, 
the UK’s list was divided between (Group A) events, which should be broadcast live on free-
to-air television, and (Group B) events, which may be broadcast exclusively live on pay-TV, 
as long as adequate provision has been made for ‘secondary’ (i.e.. highlights) coverage on 
free-to-air television. The relegation of England’s cricket Test matches to the B list remains 
controversial, but, overall, the UK’s approach to major events legislation may be seen as a 
reasonable attempt to balance the need to ensure certain national events are available to all 
with the commercial interests of pay-TV broadcasters and sporting organisations. The UK’s 
approach to the application of competition law has also been relatively balanced. On the one 
hand, the UK has shown an appreciation of the special economic and cultural features of 
sports broadcasting, most notably when, during the late-1990s, the Restrictive Practices Court 
ruled that the collective selling of PL football rights was ‘not unreasonable and not against 
the public interest’ (RPC, 1999). On the other hand, the UK’s main communications 
regulator, Ofcom, has attempted to tackle BSkyB’s market power in the UK pay-TV market 
through the introduction of a ‘wholesale must offer’ system and regulated pricing (Ofcom, 
2010). However, to date, this intervention has only prompted a lengthy legal struggle with 
BSkyB at the UK’s Competitions Appeal Tribunal (Sweney, 2014).  
 
In recent years at least, Italy could also be argued to have adopted a fairly balanced approach 
to the regulation of sports broadcasting. First, in 2011, Italy extended the scope of its major 
events legislation to offer protection to a number of national sporting events not included in 
the country’s initial (1999) submission to the EU, including the Italian MotoGP Grand Prix 
and Six Nations rugby matches involving the Italian national team. Second, even more 
significantly, Italy has also recently moved from an individual to a collective system for the 
selling of television rights to its top football leagues, Serie A and Serie B. Traditionally 
Italian clubs had sold the rights to their matches on an individual basis (as it is the case in 
Spain), and this was a position that was also legally sanctioned in 1999 (Law 78/1999). 
However, amidst the unprecedented financial and sporting scandal that engulfed Italian 
football at the end of the 2005-2006 football season, the government introduced legislation 
(Law 106/ 2007), which aimed to reduce the income disparities between Italian clubs and 
improve competitive balance by introducing the joint ownership of broadcasting rights 
between the League and the participating clubs, as well as sanctioning the ‘centralised 
commercialisation’ of such rights. Less positively, Sky Italia, owned by News Corporation, 
and formed following a (2003) merger between Stream (News Corporation) and Telepiu 
(Vivendi), has established a dominant position in the Italian pay-TV market. This has 
occurred despite the inclusion of certain regulatory conditions following the merger, such as 
limits to the duration of exclusive rights to premium content (including football rights) to two 
years. With this in mind, it could be argued that, as in the UK, there remains a need for the 
more rigorous application of competition law to the distribution of sports channels in order to 
achieve a properly balanced approach to sports broadcasting regulation.   
 
Conclusion 
Based on a comparative analysis of television sports broadcasting regulation across a range of 
different countries, as well as the EU, this article has highlighted the value (and achievability) 
of a regulatory approach that seeks to balance the commercial interests of broadcasters and 
sports organisations with the wider socio-cultural interests of citizens and society as a whole. 
More specifically, a number of key points are worth highlighting. First, there is little, if any, 
evidence to support the notion put forward by some opponents of major events legislation 
that such legislation is no longer required in a digital media environment characterised by 
new ways for viewers to watch (and pay) for sports programming. On the contrary, in such a 
media environment, where direct payment for popular programming is likely to become 
increasingly common, it can be argued that there is more, not less, need for regulatory 
intervention to enhance cultural citizenship via free-to-air coverage of major sports events. 
On this basis, there is a case for the introduction of major events legislation in countries, such 
as Brazil and the US, and the strengthening of such legislation in countries, such as South 
Africa. Second, the EU’s approach to major events legislation demonstrates the value of a 
relatively clear set of criteria for the inclusion of events on any list to be protected for free-to-
air broadcasting. A similar approach could be adopted in countries where the existing criteria 
are unclear, such as India and Australia, which, particularly in the case of Australia, may lead 
to a marginal reduction in the number of events covered, but would enhance the legitimacy of 
the legislation.   
Third, to date, the application of competition law to sports broadcasting has focused mostly 
on the sports rights market (i.e. the selling of television rights by sporting organisations to 
broadcasters). The examples considered here suggest that the case for the collective selling of 
broadcast rights by sports leagues has been widely accepted. However, as again best 
demonstrated by the EU, regulatory safeguards may be required, such as the unbundling of 
rights into a number of different packages, to limit the anti-competitive tendencies associated 
with collective selling. Other countries, perhaps most notably India, could benefit from the 
adoption of a similar approach. 
 
Fourth, the attention of policy makers and regulators should now turn to ensuring increased 
competition within the sports programming market (i.e. the ‘downstream’ market for the 
distribution of sports channels/programming to consumers). To a greater or lesser degree, in 
almost all of the countries considered here the sports programming market was characterised 
by the market power of dominant pay-TV broadcasters (i.e. BSkyB, Foxtel, MultiChoice, Sky 
Italia and TV Globo). To some extent, the market power of pay-TV broadcasters has 
been/can be diluted through the unbundled sale of rights packages, but this approach does not 
automatically further consumer interests. For example, the unbundling approach does not rule 
out the possibility of one party acquiring the most significant rights packages and dominating 
the sports programming market. To ensure competition in the pay-TV market, regulatory 
intervention is required in the form of a wholesale obligation to supply sports channels to 
rival delivery platforms (as, at least partially, applied in the UK). Commercial rivals might 
agree channel distribution deals without the need for regulatory intervention, but in the 
absence of regulatory intervention, any such deals are overly reliant on the commercial 
incentives and/or goodwill of dominant pay-TV broadcasters. Ultimately, the reward for 
regulatory intervention along these lines could prove to be lower retail prices for consumers.  
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